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Disbelief Is a Distinct Doxastic Attitude 
J. A. Smart1 
Abstract While epistemologists routinely employ disbelief talk, it is not 
clear that they really mean it, given that they often equate disbeliev-
ing p with believing ¬p. I argue that this is a mistake—disbelief is a doxas-
tic attitude of rejection and is distinct from belief (and withholding). I first 
clarify this claim and its opposition, then show that we must distinguish 
disbelieving p from believing ¬p in order to account for the fact that we 
continue to hold doxastic attitudes toward propositions that we reject. Af-
ter defending this argument against some possible objections, I examine 
several cases that reveal disbelieving p to be not only non-identical to be-
lieving ¬p, but independent of that attitude as well. Finally, I sketch some 
immediate and potential consequences of recognizing disbelief as a distinct 
doxastic attitude, particularly for work on epistemic rationality. 
Keywords Disbelief ∙ Doxastic attitudes ∙ Belief ∙ Withholding ∙ Epistemic 
Rationality 
1 Introduction 
I argue that, in addition to belief and withholding, there is a distinct, third 
doxastic attitude,2 that of disbelief. Call this the Distinct Attitude Thesis. 
Readers may be forgiven for thinking this thesis in need of no defense. 
Epistemologists do routinely include disbelief in their presentations of the 
doxastic attitudes. For example, in his introductory text on epistemology, 
Richard Feldman says that, “when you consider a statement, you can adopt 
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§3.2). 
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any of three attitudes toward it: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judg-
ment” (Feldman 2003, 13).3 And John Turri cites philosophers from Sextus 
Empiricus to Ernest Sosa as endorsing the view, Triad, that “there are only 
three doxastic attitudes—belief, disbelief, and withholding” (2012, p. 355). 
Certainly Triad captures a common way that epistemologists talk 
about doxastic attitudes, but if it is understood as a substantive claim about 
their nature, then it does not seem to be nearly so popular.4 Often, when 
the three putative attitudes are introduced, the author goes on to make an 
aside indicating that ‘disbelief’, in fact, simply refers to a subset of beliefs. 
For instance, Michael Bergmann lists the doxastic attitudes as, “believing 
p, disbelieving p (i.e., believing p is false), and withholding p” (Bergmann 
2005, 420). In a similar vein, Jack Spencer stipulates that, “an agent disbe-
lieves that p just if that agent believes that ¬p” (Spencer 2016, 512), and Mi-
chael Pace identifies the two non-belief doxastic attitudes as withholding 
and “disbelieving p (i.e. believing not-p)” (Pace 2010, 252).5 In fact, this sort 
of equivalence is mundane enough that some authors simply switch be-
tween “disbelieve p” and ”believe ¬p” without comment.6 Thus, in her dis-
cussion of suspended judgment, Jane Friedman notes that, while episte-
mologists often talk of suspension as “some third thing” in addition to be-
lief and disbelief, “If a p-disbelief is nothing more than a ¬p-belief (which 
is a fairly standard assumption in this context), then… [it] is really only a 
second thing” (2013b, p. 166 n. 2). 
Let’s use the label Negated Content Approach to cover this “fairly stand-
ard assumption” and various ways of fleshing it out. §2 clarifies this 
 
3 We will not draw any distinctions among withholding (belief or judgment), suspen-
sion (of belief or judgment), or agnosticism. (See also n. 9.) 
4 In conversation, Turri has said that he was thinking of the substantive claim, but 
that given that his arguments do not depend on it, his statement of the traditional 
view can reasonably be read as also covering the Negated Content Approach dis-
cussed below. 
5 I take ¬p, it is false that p, it is not the case that p, etc. to be equivalent, and we will 
not distinguish among them, except in §5.3, when considering the possibility of 
holding distinct attitudes toward ¬p and p is false. 




approach, as well as the Distinct Attitude Thesis and the standard picture 
of doxastic attitudes with which we will be working. One upshot here is 
that, on that standard picture, the Negated Content Approach and Distinct 
Attitude Thesis seem to be the only games in town. §3 provides the Distinct 
Object Argument in favor of the latter over the former, and §4 considers and 
rejects the Ipso Facto Response to that argument. §5 then argues for a strong 
version of the Distinct Attitude Thesis on which disbelieving p is not 
merely non-identical to believing p, but independent of that attitude as 
well. Finally, §6 briefly explores some potential upshots of the Distinct At-
titude Thesis, particularly with respect to epistemic rationality. 
2 Setup 
2.1 Doxastic attitudes 
The doxastic attitudes are a class of cognitive propositional attitudes. Typ-
ically, that class is defined by giving its extension—standardly, belief, disbe-
lief, and withholding—but saying a little more will be helpful for setting up 
the discussion below. We can do so by taking as our starting point that 
belief is the archetypical doxastic attitude (as the root dox- suggests). Here, 
we needn’t commit ourselves to any detailed metaphysics of belief. What 
is relevant for our purposes is that belief is the cognitive attitude of ac-
ceptance. Specifically, it is the attitude of committed acceptance. So, belief 
that p goes beyond mere inclination toward, partial, or tentative acceptance 
of p. 
Of course, there are many propositions that we don’t believe. Often this 
is because we hold no attitude toward them at all. Before composing this 
sentence, I held no attitude toward the proposition Socrates died before all 
living dogs were born, because it had simply never crossed my mind. Some-
times, however, we hold no attitude toward a proposition despite having 
a certain sort of awareness of it. Were I to flip through an advanced physics 
textbook, I would doubtless find many sentences employing concepts that 
I do not understand. In such a case, I am aware that the sentence expresses 
a proposition, but lack the right sort of cognitive relationship to that 
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proposition for it to be the object of a doxastic attitude for me. A label will 
be helpful here, so let us say that S entertains p whenever S is in the neces-
sary cognitive relationship to p to have an attitude toward it.7 
Given all this, it is a fairly straightforward matter to fill out the stand-
ard picture of doxastic attitudes. If one does not believe p, then one does 
not accept it, but if one nevertheless entertains p, then that non-acceptance 
is attitudinal (i.e. it is not in virtue of failing to have any doxastic attitude 
toward p whatsoever). This non-acceptance can be committal—one can 
(fully) reject p—or it can be non-committal—one can be neutral with re-
spect to p—and these possibilities correspond to the standard non-belief 
doxastic attitudes: disbelief and withholding, respectively.8 
The discussion of doxastic attitudes above has referred to disbelief, 
however this is only for the sake of simplicity. The general acceptance-re-
jection-neutrality picture of doxastic attitudes is fairly standard in episte-
mology, and, considered in those broad strokes, it should be acceptable to 
disbelief deniers and defenders alike. There are, of course, those who reject 
that picture. Some authors take (outright) doxastic attitudes to reduce to 
credences,9 and on eliminativism, disbelief, belief, and withholding all go 
down the same drain.10 Importantly, however, we will set aside these (and 
other) radically revisionary views. Our question is whether we can do 
 
7 This is less than ideal, as ‘entertains’ normally indicates a certain sort of mental 
activity. On our stipulative use, however, it does not imply that the agent con-
sciously considers p. One entertains p whenever one is in a position to believe p 
(whether by holding an occurrent or dispositional belief that p), whatever relation-
ship that entails. 
8 The neutrality ascribed to withholding here is broad, covering anything between 
full rejection and full acceptance. (Compare Roderick Chisholm’s (1976) explica-
tion of withholding h as “not accepting h and not accepting ¬h” (p. 27).) Some 
authors take withholding to require something in addition to this broad neutrality 
(e.g. Friedman (2013b)) and/or propose additional neutral attitudes (e.g. Turri 
(2012) and (McGrath 2020), though McGrath’s additions are non-doxastic). These 
differences will not matter below, given the choice of cases and our focus on dis-
belief 
9 Cf. (Leitgeb 2013). 
10 Cf. (Churchland and Churchland 1998). 
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without disbelief while maintaining this traditional understanding of the 
doxastic attitudes. 
2.2 The Distinct Attitude Thesis and the Negated Content Approach 
Another way of putting the question of this paper is this. Once we have 
accepted the standard picture of doxastic attitudes sketched above, should 
we take its references to disbelief to be eliminable? 
According to the Distinct Attitude Thesis, we should not. On that view, 
when one rejects p, it is in virtue of holding the purely negative attitude 
toward p that is not identical to any attitude of acceptance (or neutrality) 
one might hold. It is to this distinct attitude that our disbelief talk refers. 
According to the denier, this disbelief talk is merely a convenient short-
hand—strictly speaking, there is no such purely negative attitude. As we 
have seen, the Negated Content Approach eliminates disbelief by para-
phrasing “disbelieves p” as “believes ¬p” (and mutatis mutandis for cog-
nates). 
This basic idea is clear, as far as it goes, but it only goes as far as one 
might expect from scattered parenthetical comments. In particular, it 
leaves open the question of what to say about ¬p-disbeliefs. If, for such 
comments, we take p to be a fully general propositional variable, then they 
would have it that ¬p-disbeliefs are disguised ¬¬p-beliefs. While that is the 
normal way to read ‘p’ in philosophical writing, it has, for the Negated 
Content Approach, the prima facie implausible consequence that we rou-
tinely form double-negation beliefs.11 It certainly does not seem that we 
always do, and, moreover, it does not seem that we always can. At the very 
least, children surely pass through a stage where they are able to grasp 
 
11 Here, I am setting aside the Lewis/Stalnaker view of content. In its simplest 
form, at least, there is no distinction between a ¬¬p-belief and a p-belief, since ¬¬p 
and p are true in the same set of possible worlds While I attempt to remain as 
metaphysically neutral as possible, I take this simple version of the view to be suf-
ficiently problematic and unpopular to safely ignore. An investigation into 
whether and how the points of this subsection might be made on more sophisti-
cated versions would take us too far afield. (Thanks to Declan Smithies for sug-
gesting this clarification.) 
6 
 
(singly) negated propositions and accept or reject them, but fail to under-
stand double negation. Such agents’ rejection of any ¬p could not, there-
fore, consist in believing ¬¬p.12 
In fact, I suspect that most disbelief deniers would not endorse this 
strict reading of the Negated Content Approach. I think it is more likely 
that they would take statements equating disbelief that p with belief that 
¬p to imply a sort of symmetrical p/¬p relationship, such that rejection of 
either consists in believing the other. This understanding is certainly more 
intuitive. Our everyday reasoning rarely involves double negation, but we 
do often debate between the members of p/¬p pairs. Still, not all of our 
reasoning is of the everyday sort, and I am skeptical of the claim that we 
always immediately form a p-belief when we reject ¬p, especially in theo-
retical contexts. For instance, an intuitionist like Michael Dummett might 
reject ¬p and accept ¬¬p, yet consider it an open question whether p, one 
that he might investigate despite being settled on the question of whether 
¬p.13, 14 
There is, of course, a third possible interpretation of statements equat-
ing p-disbelief to ¬p-belief. It is to take the relevant p/¬p-relationship to be 
 
12 There is a more general graspability issue as well, given that this interpretation 
is not restricted to rejection of singly negated propositions. Plausibly, the negation 
of a proposition is more complex than that proposition itself. By iterating negation, 
then, any (finite) agent will reach a proposition (¬… ¬p) that they are able to en-
tertain and reject, but whose negation is beyond their grasp. (This point is based 
on an argument for belief-credence dualism by Elizabeth Jackson (ms.).) 
13 This way of putting the matter is taken from (Friedman 2019). There, she argues 
that when one inquires one holds an “interrogative attitude” toward a question 
(e.g. wondering whether), and belief is an attitude that settles inquiry such that one 
no longer holds the question-directed attitude. Presumably, when one rejects ¬p 
one settles a question as well, and so if the question of whether p can remain open, 
that rejection is not in virtue of believing p. Importantly, however, I do not wish to 
rely on Friedman’s account here. Rather, I take it to provide a potential explanation 
of the strength of the intuition to which I am appealing. 
14 I address questions about the possibility of conforming one’s attitudes to princi-
ples of deviant logics in §4.3 and §5.2. In this case, note that the problem stands so 
long as it is possible for an intuitionistic reasoner to focus on the question of 
whether ¬p or ¬¬p such that, if their rejection of ¬p consists in forming some belief, 
it is the belief that ¬¬p. (Perhaps they would automatically form the belief that p 
as well, but only as an inference, even if unconscious.)  
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that of contradiction rather than of strict negation. Sometimes ¬p-disbeliefs 
are disguised p-beliefs and sometimes they are disguised ¬¬p-beliefs, but 
either way they are still disguised beliefs, not attitudes of a distinct type. 
This interpretation seems the most charitable. It captures the widest range 
of intuitions, and no arguments below turn on whether the Negated Con-
tent Approach attempts to reduce disbeliefs to beliefs in a unified way. So, 
though we may occasionally refer back to the statements in §1, in what fol-
lows, we will understand the Negated Content Approach to be the view 
that doxastic rejection of a proposition consists in holding a belief in some 
contradictory of that proposition. 
2.3 Exhaustive Options 
Not only is the Negated Content Approach the most common (non-radical) 
proposal for eliminating disbelief, it is also, so far as I can tell, the only 
proposal. This may simply be because issue has not been on philosophers’ 
radar. But in fact it is difficult to see what other approach one might take 
once we accept a standard picture of doxastic attitudes. Our doxastic states 
obviously involve rejection of propositions, and if such rejections do not 
consist in holding negative attitudes then it seems that they must consist 
in holding attitudes toward negative content. For our purposes, then, it 
seems that the Distinct Attitude Thesis and Negated Content Approach are 
the only two options on the table. 
3 The need for disbelief 
3.1 The Distinct Object Argument 
One basic reason to think that disbelief is a distinct attitude is phenomeno-
logical. When we, say, consider some philosophical view and find it want-
ing, there is a sense of cognitively “pushing away” the relevant proposi-
tion(s) that is not the same as “taking in” their negations. We seem to ac-
tively take a stance of rejection. Of course, this appeal to phenomenology 
is not a strong argument. Further, like any reductivist position, the 
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Negated Content Approach enjoys at least the theoretical advantage of 
simplicity. Feelings aside, if p-disbeliefs and ¬p-beliefs are both ways of 
rejecting p and we are already committed to the existence of the latter, then 
the former seem to be otiose. 
To see why, on the contrary, they are theoretically necessary, let’s con-
sider the case of Atheist Alfred. 
Atheist Alfred 
Alfred has been raised in an obscure, isolated community that stu-
diously avoids mention of deities of any sort. One day, however, he 
breaks with his community and moves to the nearest city, where he 
happens upon a street preacher. Though surprised to learn that 
there is this being, God, about whom he had never heard, Alfred 
takes the preacher at his word, becoming a theist. Later, however, 
he finds out that many people don’t believe that there is such a be-
ing, and, unsure who has the right of it, he becomes agnostic. Later 
still, a friend convinces him of the seriousness of the problem of 
evil, and Alfred becomes an atheist. 
Alfred poses a problem for the Negated Content Approach that we can 
see by tracking his religious journey through his doxastic attitudes toward 
the proposition God exists. Initially he was theologically innocent—he did 
not entertain that proposition, and therefore held no attitude toward it. He 
then became a theist by forming the belief that God exists. Next, he became 
an agnostic, withholding on God exists. But what should we say about his 
attitude toward God exists on his conversion to atheism? He obviously does 
not maintain an attitude of withholding on it or revert to an attitude of 
believing it, but on the Negated Content Approach there are no other op-
tions. On that view, then, it appears that atheist-Alfred holds no doxastic 
attitude toward this proposition whatsoever. Surely this cannot be right. 
Of course, this is not to say that on the Negated Content Approach 
atheist-Alfred holds no God-related doxastic attitudes. On that view, how-
ever, we can only say that Alfred forms the belief that God does not exist 
(which we can say on the Distinct Attitude Thesis as well). While this is a 
natural way to identify atheism, it is also a change of subject—or, rather, a 
change of object. After all, God exists and God does not exist are distinct 
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propositions, and so God exists is not an object of the belief that God does not 
exist.15 
The idea that rejecting a proposition involves holding no attitude to-
ward it (whether or not it also involves accepting the proposition’s nega-
tion16)  is not only highly unintuitive, but, at best, in tension with tradi-
tional treatments of doxastic attitudes in epistemology. Consider standard 
introductions of withholding as a distinct doxastic attitude of the sort given 
in §2.1. Cast in terms of Alfred’s case, the idea is that, innocent-Alfred and 
agnostic-Alfred are in different doxastic positions vis-à-vis God exists. Both 
lack doxastic commitment with respect to it, but since agnostic-Alfred is 
aware of (entertains) God exists, his lack of commitment consists in a par-
ticular stance with respect to that proposition. He holds an attitude of neu-
trality toward it, the attitude of withholding. Similarly, it is surely the case 
that atheist-Alfred’s doxastic position with respect to God exists also differs 
from that of innocent-Alfred. Neither are doxastically positive or neutral 
toward God exists, but in atheist-Alfred’s case this is because he takes a par-
ticular stance with respect to that proposition. He holds an attitude of rejec-
tion toward it, the attitude of disbelief. 
3.2 Support from credences 
While our focus is on outright doxastic attitudes, the Distinct Object Argu-
ment finds some support in credal considerations. Upon hearing the street 
preacher, Alfred clearly has a credence in God exists, and a fairly high one 
at that. It decreases, however, as he moves from theism to agnosticism, and 
 
15 The point is particularly clear if we put the matter a bit more formally. On the 
Negated Content Approach, the only two doxastic attitudes one can hold toward 
a proposition, p, are belief (Bp) and withholding (Wp). Therefore, where Np is not 
having a doxastic attitude toward p: (¬Bp ˄ ¬Wp) → Np. By definition, atheists 
such as Alfred neither believe nor withhold on g, God exists.  (¬Bg ˄ ¬Wg) → Ng. 
On the Negated Content Approach, atheist-Alfred holds no attitude toward God 
exists. (Of course, he does believe God does not exist (B¬g), but, obviously, ¬g ≠ g.) 
16 In §4 I consider (and reject) the response that in believing ¬p one holds a doxastic 
attitude toward p. For now, I simply note that the idea that doxastic rejection con-
sists in holding an attitude of acceptance seems odd, to put it mildly. 
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even further as he moves from agnosticism to atheism. It does not disap-
pear though. Indeed, we could use Alfred’s credence in God exists to track 
changes in the nature of Alfred’s atheism. Perhaps it goes from begrudging 
to psychologically certain. At that point, Alfred’s credence in God exists is 
0, but he still does have a credal attitude toward that proposition. Now, 
outright doxastic attitudes are not credences (it even seems doubtful that 
they correspond to precise ranges of level of credence), nevertheless, the 
two are clearly connected. They are two important types of belief-like atti-
tudes that “go together” in a certain way, as illustrated by the tracking of 
Alfred’s journey above. At the very least, then, it would be surprising to 
learn that atheist-Alfred continues to have a credence in God exists but no 
(outright) doxastic attitude toward it. 
4 The Ipso Facto Response 
4.1 General Ipso Facto Response 
According to the Distinct Object Argument, we should reject the Negated 
Content Approach because it has it that atheist-Alfred holds no doxastic 
attitude toward God exists, when he clearly does. When I have made this 
argument in conversation, I have occasionally received a reply along the 
lines of, “Of course atheist-Alfred still holds a doxastic attitude toward God 
exists. He believes it is false!” Presumably, this reply is not meant to deny 
that God exists and it is false that God exists are distinct propositions. Rather, 
the idea seems to be that we do not need to appeal to a distinct attitude of 
disbelief because, in holding the belief that it is false that God exists, atheist-
Alfred ipso facto holds a doxastic attitude toward God exists. Let’s call this 
precisification the Ipso Facto Response.17 
I can somewhat feel the pull of the Ipso Facto Response, but the devil is 
in the details. We need clarification on what it means to “ipso facto hold a 
doxastic attitude,” and what the basis is for thinking that atheist-Alfred 
 




bears this relation to God exists. Likely there are several ways of fleshing 
out the response. However, I think that there are two main motivating 
ideas or intuitions that drive these interpretations, and it will suffice to con-
sider a few variations related to these. 
4.2 Constituent-Ipso Facto Response 
The first motivation we will consider is the idea that p is “contained by,” 
or is a constituent of, ¬p. That being the case, when one holds an attitude 
toward ¬p one must also hold an attitude toward p since it is in some sense 
cognitively “present.” So, when atheist-Alfred believes God does not exist 
(or, better, it is false that God exists), he ipso facto holds an attitude toward 
God exists in virtue of the latter proposition being a constituent of the for-
mer, and this distinguishes him from innocent-Alfred, who holds neither 
attitude. Let’s call this general approach the constituent-Ipso Facto Response. 
We can see right out of the gate that the constituent-Ipso Facto Response 
has a serious dialectical shortcoming, given that constituency is not sym-
metrical. Suppose that Alfred makes a new friend who provides him with 
a theodicy and various arguments for God’s existence, leading him to re-
gain his theism. At this point, the proposition that Alfred (putatively) dis-
believes, God does not exist, is obviously not a constituent of the proposition 
that he believes, God exists.18 So, even if the constituent-Ipso Facto Response 
worked, we would need an entirely different accounting of negation-dis-
beliefs (and, even if this could be provided, the whole enterprise starts to 
feel a bit ad hoc). 
However, I do not think that the constituent approach will give us 
even a partially successful response to the Direct Object Argument. Con-
sider that there does not appear to be anything special about the doxastic 
role of negation as opposed to that of other logical operators.19 Presumably, 
 
18 As discussed in §2.2, the most plausible interpretation of the Negated Content 
Approach treats ¬p-disbeliefs as either disguised p-beliefs or disguised ¬¬p-be-
liefs, and it is implausible to think that one believes ¬¬p whenever one believes p 
(see n. 12). 
19 Excepting, perhaps, the acceptance-rejection relationship discussed in §4.3. 
12 
 
then, there is a more general principle underlying this response—some-
thing along the following lines. 
Ipso Facto Attitude Thesis 
When S holds a doxastic attitude toward a complex proposition, S 
ipso facto holds a doxastic attitude toward its propositional constit-
uents.20 
This thesis itself admits of two interpretations. On one, the attitude toward 
the constituent proposition just is the attitude toward the complex propo-
sition—the constituent proposition is an “ipso facto object” of the attitude 
toward the complex proposition. On the other, the attitude toward the con-
stituent is a distinct attitude that simply comes along for the ride—it is an 
“ipso facto attitude.” 
Importantly, the Ipso Facto Attitude Thesis enjoys some intuitive sup-
port beyond negation-belief cases. Suppose that S receives testimony from 
an authority that p  q. S knows nothing relevant about the subject other 
than that the authority has endorsed this conjunction. So, they come to be-
lieve it, but never bother with thinking about p or q individually. Intui-
tively, S nevertheless holds doxastic attitudes toward these propositions. 
In believing p  q, S ipso facto believes p and believes q. 
Unfortunately, however, the thesis runs into problems when we move 
beyond conjunction-beliefs to other sorts of attitudes or complex proposi-
tions. Suppose, for instance, that S receives expert testimony that p → ¬q, 
and comes to believe that proposition. They also believe p, but they have 
never entertained ¬q (or q, for that matter) as an individual proposition. 
The Ipso Facto Attitude Thesis tells us that S yet holds an attitude with only 
¬q as its object. But which attitude? If ¬q is an ipso facto object of the belief 
that p → ¬q, then ¬q is the object of a belief S holds—S believes ¬q. That 
seems reasonable, but, of course ¬q is itself a complex proposition, and it 
seems that we should therefore also say that S believes q. Surely that can’t 
be right. Perhaps, then, S holds an ipso facto attitude toward ¬q. But, again, 
we must ask what that attitude is. True, S is rationally committed to 
 
20 While complex propositions are standardly those involving two or more constit-
uent propositions, for our purposes they include any proposition that involves a 
logical operator and a constituent proposition. 
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believing q, but we should not derive an is from an ought. Not only is the 
motivation to do so undermined by the existence of actual agents who re-
ject q despite believing p and p → q, but the move would also threaten to 
collapse the traditional distinction between dispositional attitudes and dis-
positions to hold attitudes.21 
At this point, the defender of ipso facto attitudes might reply that the 
situation appealed to above is impossible. One could not form an attitude 
toward a complex proposition (de re) without entertaining its propositional 
constituents, and this, in turn, entails holding a doxastic attitude toward 
them. So, the Ipso Facto Attitude Thesis was misleading in the first place. 
So-called “ipso facto attitudes” are really just normal attitudes that one 
holds due to ipso facto entertaining the constituents of complex proposi-
tions that one entertains. Which attitude one holds toward the constituent 
proposition(s) is simply “up to the agent” the way that it always is. 
I am sympathetic to the idea that when one entertains a complex prop-
osition, one entertains its individual constituents. If that is the case, how-
ever, it only serves to highlight a more fundamental problem for the con-
stituent-Ipso Facto Response qua response to the Distinct Object Argument. 
The attitude that atheist-Alfred takes toward God exists may be “up to 
him,” but now we must ask what that attitude could be. The defender of the 
response rejects disbelief as an option, but we don’t want to say that athe-
ists either believe or withhold on God exists. Perhaps it could be tempting 
to say that Alfred holds no particular attitude, or one that is in some sense 
generic or “flavorless.” But it is unclear how a such an attitude could be a 
doxastic attitude (to what sort of epistemic norms would it be subject?), and 
it would also mean relinquishing the Negated Content Approach’s prima 
facie advantage over the Distinct Attitude Thesis of greater parsimony. We 
might, instead, try to capture the idea of generic-ness by allowing that one 
could entertain p without holding any doxastic attitude toward it, and say-
ing simply that S is in a doxastic state that, though non-attitudinal, is yet p-
directed. True, such a state would be enough to distinguish atheist-Alfred 
from innocent-Alfred. However, that is not, by itself, enough to salvage the 
Ipso Facto Response. Alfred’s journey indicates (and we could always 
 
21 See (Audi 1994). 
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stipulate) that, at least when he is making the conversion to atheism, he is 
actively considering God exists. On converting, he does not bear some ge-
neric cognitive relationship to that proposition. He rejects it. 
4.3 Rejection-Ipso Facto Response 
This appeal to rejection leads us to the second (and perhaps more plausi-
ble) interpretation of the Ipso Facto Response, on which it should be under-
stood as making the claim that belief that ¬p is ipso facto an attitude toward 
p. Presumably this is not meant to deny that p and ¬p are distinct proposi-
tions, and we have already seen the sorts of problems that arise for positing 
that a belief that ¬p is an attitude toward p in some generic sense. The idea 
then seems to be the following. 
Ipso Facto Rejection Thesis 
When S believes ¬p, that belief is ipso facto a doxastic attitude to-
ward p in virtue of the fact that acceptance of ¬p is ipso facto rejection 
of p.  
At a glance, this construal of the Ipso Facto Response does seem able to 
get around the considerations above (at least, when combined with the 
claim that entertaining a complex proposition entails entertaining its prop-
ositional constituents). On closer examination, though, it is difficult to see 
how it could do so without abandoning the traditional picture of doxastic 
attitudes that we have taken on as a working constraint. It seems just about 
as fundamental of an aspect of that view as there could be that holding a 
belief with p as its object means that one accepts, not rejects, that proposi-
tion.22 
That said, the Ipso Facto Rejection Thesis is not without motivation. 
Consider that the cognitive acts of acceptance and rejection closely mirror 
the linguistic acts of assertion and denial, and, in ordinary circumstances, 
 
22 It might be objected that this construal is misleading—p is part of the content of 
a belief that ¬p, even if it is not the object of acceptance for that attitude. However, 
this is basically to take p as an “ipso facto object” of belief that ¬p, and we have 
already seen the problems with that approach. (Thanks to Declan Smithies for flag-
ging this consideration.) 
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when one asserts ¬p one ipso facto denies p. It does not seem unreasonable, 
then, to think that when one accepts ¬p one ipso facto rejects p. 
There are problems with appealing to this analogy, however. The need 
for ordinary circumstances to be in place for the ipso facto relationship be-
tween assertion and denial indicates that in such cases one should be un-
derstood as performing the distinct illocutionary acts of assertion and de-
nial by making a single utterance, not making an assertion that is a denial. 
A more appropriate analogy would have belief as the analog of an utter-
ance in virtue of which one both accepts and rejects. Belief, then, would not 
be an attitude of acceptance per se, but an attitude of commitment with dual 
valance.23 Not only is this at odds with our intuitive understanding of be-
lief as an attitude specifically of acceptance, but it would also require over-
haul of our understanding of the objects of belief. Instead of individual 
propositions they would have to be one or more propositional pairs. I take 
it that this would be a bridge too far for those who wish to maintain some-
thing resembling the traditional picture of the doxastic attitudes. 
In addition, there is another problem faced not only by this Janus-Belief 
proposal, but the rejection-Ipso Facto Response in general.24 Consider that 
dialetheists provide a type of case that violates the “ordinary circum-
stances” constraint above, as they are perfectly happy to assert (at least 
some) contradictions. More to the current point, dialetheists believe contra-
dictions. When a dialetheist both believes p is true and p is false, the Ipso 
Facto Rejection Thesis seems to have it that they both accept and reject p, 
but not even dialetheists think that is possible.25 One might reply that di-
aletheists are simply mistaken about their own attitudes. Perhaps they be-
lieve true contradictions exist, or even that p is true and p is false is an example 
of a true contradiction, but not contradictions themselves, as doing so (at 
 
23 At this point, of course, the rejection we are considering is not ipso facto, but we 
can always find a more appropriate name should the strategy prove out. 
24 Indeed, it is a problem for any version of the Negated Content Approach. How-
ever, its relevance is most straightforward in the context of the Ipso Facto Rejection 
Thesis. 
25 Cf. (Priest, 2008, §6.5). 
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least knowingly) is impossible.26 This is dubious at best, however, and not 
only because it denies the claims of intelligent, carefully introspective di-
aletheists. Even those who strive for perfect consistency often fail to 
achieve it. Most of us have had the unpleasant experience of discovering 
that we hold contradictory beliefs. Yet, when we gain that knowledge, we 
do not instantly and automatically cease to hold them. The rational require-
ment not to simultaneously believe p and ¬p is a norm, not a necessity.27 
Doubtless, some will remain unwilling to countenance the possibility 
of knowingly believing contradictions. If so, then they owe a response to 
this and other arguments to the contrary28 that does not depend on the 
view in question. Alternatively, there may a principled way to accept the 
possibility, but “quarantine” dialetheists (though I am highly skeptical). 
So, this is not a knockdown argument against the Ipso Facto Rejection The-
sis, nevertheless, it does place an additional burden on the defenders of 
that view. We should also keep in mind that this burden is secondary. Even 
if it is shouldered, the fact remains that ipso facto rejection leads to a picture 
of belief that is not merely revisionary, but radically so. Not only does de-
veloping and defending such a picture present a greater challenge, it aban-
dons the traditional understanding of the doxastic attitudes to the extent 
that it is out of bounds in the current dialectical context.  
5 A Distinction with a Difference 
 
26 It is worth noting that even allowing for beliefs of this sort puts pressure on the 
defender of the Ipso Facto Rejection Thesis to reject all ipso facto attitudes. I suspect 
that they would be inclined to accept the most intuitive examples, such as ipso facto 
belief in the conjuncts of a believed conjunction. Such intuitions would seem to 
extend to beliefs of the form p  q is a true conjunction. Yet if ipso facto rejection 
defenders allow that the latter form yields ipso facto belief in the conjuncts, they 
must add, “unless the conjuncts are known to be contradictory.” This seems ad hoc, 
and, given the small difference between belief that p  q and belief that p  q is a 
true conjunction, it appears more appropriate to reject ipso facto attitudes altogether. 
27 This is a variation on an argument by Priest (2006, 96 – 97). 
28 See (Priest 2006, 96 – 97) and (Routley and Routley 1975, 211 – 212). 
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5.1 Independent Disbelief 
The Distinct Object Argument reveals that we need an something more 
than belief (or withholding) to account for the fact that we continue to hold 
doxastic attitudes toward propositions that we reject. We need a distinct 
doxastic attitude of disbelief. However, there is distinct, and then there is 
distinct. For all that we have said thus far, there may yet be a necessary 
connection of some sort between rejecting a proposition and accepting its 
contradictory. This section argues that, to the contrary, disbelief is a dis-
tinct doxastic attitude in the strong sense that it is independent of belief. 
While we do routinely believe contradictories of propositions that we dis-
believe, there are also cases where we do not, instead holding some other 
attitude toward them, or even no attitude at all. 
5.2 Disbelief and disbelief 
For a case of disbelief in both a proposition and its contradictory, let’s re-
turn to the topic of intuitionistic reasoning (briefly discussed in §2), adapt-
ing an example from Michael Dummett.29 Dummett moves intuitionism 
from its mathematical origins into ordinary circumstances by tying it to 
anti-realism, a view that rejects the correspondence theory of truth in a way 
that allows meaningful assertions to be neither true nor false.30 Suppose 
that Hank is an anti-realist of this sort, and that he is considering whether 
it’s true that Brita wasn’t brave, given that she never in life faced a situation 
in which she was given the opportunity to act bravely or not. Eventually, 
he decides (justifiedly or not) that the counterfactuals relevant to such 
questions do not ground any truth of the matter in Brita’s case. So, Hank 
accepts it isn’t true that Brita wasn’t brave. Naturally enough, he rejects Brita 
wasn’t brave, but given his anti-realist reasoning, he also rejects Brita was 
 
29 See (Dummett 1978, 14 – 16). While Dummett’s original example is given in 
terms of assertion and denial, rather than belief and disbelief, he explicitly intro-
duces it by noting that even those who reject the correspondence theory of truth 
often remain realist in their thinking. 
30 The details of this connection needn’t concern us here. 
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brave. In the end, then, Hank disbelieves both Brita was brave and a contra-
dictory of that proposition. 
As with dialetheism in §4.3, some will no doubt be skeptical that agents 
can conform their attitudes to intuitionistic principles. However, I find that 
difficult to buy in cases like Hank’s. One might, of course, argue that, if it 
really were not the case that “Brita was brave” is either true or false, then 
it is meaningless, and it could not be that Hank has any doxastic attitude 
whatsoever with Brita was brave as its content. But, so long as it actually is 
the case that Hank can hold a doxastic attitude toward Brita was brave, the 
point stands. Suppose Hank were raised in an intuitionist cult, cutting his 
teeth on anti-realist claims, and being fed a steady diet of arguments that 
claims about bravery and the like needn’t be either true or false. Surely, in 
such a scenario, when Hank decides that “Brita is brave” is such a claim, 
he does not continue to withhold on or come to believe either Brita was 
brave or Britta wasn’t brave. 
5.3 Disbelief and withholding 
For an example of believing a proposition while withholding on its contra-
dictory, let’s look to a case that bears some similarities with Hank’s, but 
without the non-standard commitments. Suppose that Elle is an intelligent, 
though philosophically untrained student who comes across B, the sen-
tence, “Buffalo buffalo buffalo.” It takes her a second to process, and she 
thinks, “Wait, is that sentence true?”, but once she figures out the meaning 
she rejects that idea—she disbelieves B is true. However, Elle then remem-
bers a philosopher friend once telling her that nonsense sentences can’t be 
true or false. “Buffalo buffalo buffalo” certainly sounds like nonsense, but 
she also has a vague recollection of there being different kinds of nonsense 
sentences and wonders whether B is of the neither-true-nor-false sort. Elle, 
therefore, disbelieves B is true while withholding on B is false. 
A potential worry here concerns the rendering of the propositions Elle 
entertains as B is true/false, rather than as buffalo buffalo buffalo and buffalo do 
not buffalo buffalo. Perhaps the lesson of Elle’s case is that we should not 
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have been so quick to identify belief that p is false with belief that ¬p.31 Elle 
might withhold on B is false, but believe ¬(B is true). 
While I am sympathetic to the idea that one can hold distinct attitudes 
toward p is false and ¬p,32 I don’t think that this is enough to salvage the 
Negated Content Approach. The problem is that doing so requires grasp-
ing p is false and ¬p as distinct propositions. If Elle were a philosopher or a 
logician then, when she rejects B is true she might form the belief ¬(B is true) 
without forming the belief that B is false. But she is not, and it is reasonable 
to assume (or stipulate) that she does not make this distinction. 
There is another possibility along these lines as well. Presumably, if we 
are distinguishing belief that p is false from belief that ¬p, then those who 
defend the Negated Content Approach would endorse an amendment that 
allows for putative disbeliefs to be either ¬p-beliefs or p is false-beliefs. So, 
perhaps Elle’s rejection of B is true consists in believing it is false that B is 
true. But, again, this does not seem like an apt description in Elle’s case. 
When she comes to understand what B means, she takes a (negative) stance 
on her question, “Is that sentence true?” It is no more reasonable to take 
her answer to be “’That sentence is true’ is false” than to take her initial 
question to be “Is ‘That sentence is true’ true?” 
5.4 Disbelief alone 
The last independence possibility is that one disbelieves p without enter-
taining ¬p, and therefore never holding a doxastic attitude toward it). Per-
haps surprisingly, this is, I think, the commonest type of independent dis-
belief case. Take Riley for example. Riley is describing the car show he re-
cently attended to a friend, and mentions that there were two Corvettes, a 
’65 and a ’67. His friend asks if one was red, and when Riley says yes, the 
friend asks, “Was it the ’65 or ’67 that was red?” Here, Riley doesn’t imme-
diately recall, and has to search his memory. Eventually he brings to mind 
 
31 See n. 5. 
32 This might be the case if, as is not implausible, the objects of propositional atti-




an image of the two side-by-side, the bright blue ’65 and the rich cherry 
’67. “I remember!” he says, “it was the ’67 that was red.” 
Consider Riley’s searching of his memory. It was prompted by the 
question posed to him, and so he was entertaining the pair of propositions 
the red Corvette was the ’65 (r65) and the red Corvette was the ’67 (r67). When 
he then recalled the appearance of the cars, he formed the belief that r67. 
Of course, he did not simply “forget about” the proposition r65 at that 
point. It was one of two mutually exclusive options on which he was fo-
cused, so answering the question before his mind involved rejecting that 
proposition as well as accepting its alternative—Riley formed the disbelief 
that r65. However, there is no reason to think that he also formed the belief 
that ¬r65. That was not the contrast with r65 that he was considering as 
part of his internal inquiry, So, while he will be highly disposed to be-
lieve¬r65, he won’t actually form that belief unless prompted.33 
While paradoxes and dubious cases of nonsense do not play a major 
role in most of our lives, Riley’s experience is surely a familiar one. Many 
of the questions that we consider are posed as choices among multiple pos-
itive options. We respond by accepting one and rejecting the others, but do 
not usually bother to entertain the relevant contradictories when we do so. 
There is no need, and besides, we are often focused on taking an action on 
the basis of the belief formed (even if, as in Riley’s case, this is just inform-
ing someone else). Far from exotic, then, independent disbeliefs are a rou-
tine feature of our cognition. 
6 Some Upshots of the Distinct Attitude Thesis 
6.1 Consequences for withholding and evidence 
Before closing, it is worth considering some upshots of the Distinct Atti-
tude Thesis—particularly the strong, independence version—beyond the 
status of disbelief. The most immediate of these is that it has consequences 
 
33 Riley would also form a contrary color-belief to ’65, but it would be that the ’65 
Corvette was blue, since the blueness of the car would be a highly salient color-fea-
ture of his mental image, while the non-redness would not. 
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for our understanding of withholding. Standardly, withholding on p is 
contrasted with believing either p or ¬p. These same attitudes, of course, 
contrast with neutrality on ¬p, and so to form either belief is taken to entail 
giving up withholding on both propositions. On the Distinct Attitude The-
sis, however, withholding on p contrasts with the non-neutral options of 
belief or disbelief that p, and withholding on ¬p contrasts with belief or 
disbelief that ¬p. Indeed, Elle’s case reveals the independence of withhold-
ing on p from withholding on ¬p just as much as that of disbelieving p from 
believing ¬p. 
This picture of the doxastic attitudes has epistemological ramifications 
as well. Consider that evidence (at least first-order evidence) always favors 
some committal attitude and disfavors the contrary committal attitude. On 
the Negated Content Approach, one’s evidence favoring belief that p just 
is one’s evidence disfavoring belief that ¬p. Not so on the Distinct Attitude 
Thesis, where the committal attitude contrary to believing p is disbelieving 
p. That is not to say, of course, that when one gains evidence favoring belief 
that p one does not gain evidence disfavoring belief that ¬p, but it matters 
that these evidential relationships are not one and the same. Suppose that 
S receives reliable testimony, T, that p. T is evidence (for S) that directly 
favors believing p, and, as such, also directly, and in equal measure, disfa-
vors disbelieving p. However, T only indirectly disfavors believing ¬p, 
which means that the extent to which T disfavors believing ¬p can at most 
be equal to the extent to which it disfavors disbelieving p, and may be less.34 
In many cases, differences along these lines will not have an effect on which 
attitudes are justified for an agent, but not always. For instance, they trivi-
ally make a difference in cases of testimony that one ought to disbelieve p, 
but ought not to believe ¬p, but let’s also consider how the Distinct Attitude 
thesis could have further-reaching epistemological consequences. 
 
34 At least, this is the case in most situations. The point is not fully general, due to 
some obscure possibilities. For example, T could more strongly favor believing ¬p 
for S if an oracle has told them that if they receive any testimony about p, then they 
rationally ought to believe ¬p. 
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6.2 A more speculative possibility 
To see how the consequences of the Distinct Attitude Thesis might extend 
to more specific epistemological discussions, suppose that Coco is in a lot-
tery case with an arbitrarily low chance of winning and an arbitrarily high 
payout.35 Here, her evidential support for believing my ticket is not a winner 
(¬w) is stronger than for almost any other belief she holds, yet many would 
take her to not be justified in believing that proposition. 
Let’s consider a particular basis for thinking that Coco is not justified 
in believing ¬w, the pragmatic encroachment view of Jeremy Fantl and 
Matthew McGrath (2002). They defend the following principle. 
PCA 
S is justified in believing that p only if S is rational to act as if p. 
Given the stakes of the lottery, it would be irrational for Coco to act as if 
her ticket is not a winner by throwing it away. On PCA, then, she is not 
justified in believing ¬w, but only in withholding on it (disbelief is obvi-
ously precluded by her evidence). 
If Coco is justified in withholding on ¬w, then it seems obvious that she 
should be justified in withholding on w, my ticket is a winner. But I am not 
sure that this is the case. Consider that her evidence supports disbelieving 
w to the same extreme extent that it supports believing ¬w, but here PCA 
does not come into play. It is not just that the principle does not concern 
disbelieving. It could not. The tie between rational action and justified belief 
only works because we act on beliefs about the way the world is, and the 
success or failure of our actions depends on the way that the world is.36 
Disbeliefs, on the other hand, are rejections, not opposing representations. 
They are not the sort of things that we can act on, and so it does not make 
sense that their justification would be tied to the rationality of action in a 
PCA-like way. 
 
35 Thanks to Ethan Brauer and Evan Thomas for suggesting that disbelief might be 
relevant to such cases. 
36 In the sense that I am using this phrase, one “way that the world is”, is that it is 




This lottery case is meant only to be illustrative of the potential impact 
of the Distinct Attitude Thesis, and I do not wish to commit myself to the 
analysis above. It obviously makes controversial assumptions, and I do feel 
a strong intuitive pull from the response that there could not be a difference 
in one’s justification for believing p and withholding on ¬p because there 
is something incoherent about holding that pair of attitudes. This response 
is itself not insignificant, though. It reinforces the importance of recent dis-
cussions concerning the justificatory relationship of evidence and coher-
ence, and even raises the possibility of a novel sort of conflict between the 
two.37 
7 Conclusion 
It is not uncommon for epistemologists to take rejecting p to be a matter of 
believing the negation of its content rather than holding a negative attitude 
of disbelief toward p. The Distinct Object Argument (with support from 
credal considerations) shows that this is a mistake. We continue to hold 
doxastic attitudes (obviously, negative ones) toward propositions that we 
reject. We have seen that the constituent interpretation of the Ipso Facto Re-
sponse to the Distinct Object Argument fails, and that the rejection inter-
pretation, at best, fails to do so while retaining a traditional picture of the 
doxastic attitudes. So, we should accept that there is a distinct, negative 
doxastic attitude of disbelief. Moreover, this attitude is not merely non-
identical to, but independent of, negation-belief. It is possible to disbelieve 
p while holding the attitudes of belief or withholding toward ¬p, or no at-
titude at all. And, it is this independence, in particular, that suggests ram-
ifications for the Distinct Attitude Thesis beyond the attitudinal status of 
disbelief.38 
 
37 Recent discussion in this area (e.g. (Littlejohn 2018) and (Worsnip 2018), among 
others) has focused almost exclusively on “inter-level” conflicts, and especially the 
possibility of epistemic akrasia. In the lottery and liar cases, the relevant con-
straints would be first-order (e.g. Rationality requires that if one withholds on p, 
then one does not believe or disbelieve ¬p). 
38 I am indebted to many for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts 
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